Only International Community can make a difference in the short term-Dr.Jehan Perera

The government’s decision to abrogate the Ceasefire Agreement was not unexpected.  In the last several weeks it was evident that the government would have to arrive at a new accommodation with the JVP if it was to survive. The presentation of the budget in December highlighted the government’s dependence on JVP support to maintain its majority in Parliament.  The JVP had publicly made it known that its support would come if the government was prepared to abrogate the Ceasefire Agreement, ban the LTTE and ensure the end of international intervention in the country’s ethnic conflict, said Dr.Jehan Perera, Executive Director of the National Peace Counil. 
 
From the inception of the Ceasefire Agreement in February 2002 the JVP had been its most passionate critic.  Using its skills of communication the JVP took the message that the Ceasefire Agreement endangered the unity of the country.  One set of arguments that had a deep resonance with the ethnic Sinhalese majority was the point that the agreement conceded too much to the LTTE in terms of formal recognition.  In particular the notion of lines of control with large chunks of Sri Lankan territory accepted to be under the LTTE, and the acceptance of two armies was denounced, he said.
 
Another set of arguments that the JVP devised was out of its own reading of international politics.  They claimed that if an agreement lasted for more than five years it could become permanent.  The JVP was also able to combine this bizarre theory with the accusation that the Ceasefire Agreement was a cunning device to facilitate negotiations between two countries, one existent and the other incipient.  When this was combined with the LTTE’s own violations of the Ceasefire Agreement, which were highlighted in the media and by the government, the case for continuing with it became weak in the eyes of most people.
 
These are some of the factors that account for the widespread acceptance of the abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement within the polity.  So far the opposition to the abrogation has been muted and virtually drowned out by the acclamations.  If the masses of people felt that the continuation of the Ceasefire Agreement, even as an empty shell, gave some sort of guarantee against an all-out escalation of violence, this sentiment was not immediately apparent in either the media or the streets. Even at the time of the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement there were no mass demonstrations in support of it.  Now with its demise there has been no mass action to mourn it.
 
 
INTERNATIONAL CONCERN
 
The international reactions to the abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement, however, have not been muted.  While the international response has so far been limited to statements, they have been strong.  All of the international statements have expressed disappointment and regret, and highlighted the unfeasibility of the military option that the government appears to be relying on.  So far the key international actors to have issued statements include the UN, the US, Canada, the Scandinavian countries, Japan, India, Australia and France.  The joint statement issued by the five governments of the Scandinavian bloc made the most comprehensive analysis of the benefits of the Ceasefire Agreement.
 
At the least, the expectation of these key international actors appears to be that the government needs to take decisive steps to re-activate the political process that could lead to a political solution.  Perhaps with a view to mitigate an international backlash against it, the government itself has been taking pains to affirm that a political solution will soon be on offer.  While such a positive step will be welcome, it is likely to be politically unfeasible.  The JVP has already stated that if the government proposes a federal solution, which is the minimum that could satisfy Tamil aspirations, let alone the LTTE, the JVP will work to unseat the government.
 
The irony of the present political situation is that the government, although it appears to be strong and determined at the level of its leadership, is in reality a structurally weak one.  The government’s majority in Parliament, and hence its survival, depends on a number of groups whose loyalty is in question.  The most obvious of these is the JVP with its 37 members.  Another big group is composed of the defectors from the UNP who number 27, most of whom crossed over to the government pledging to deal with issues of good governance and corruption.  A third group is composed of an unknown number of members of the ruling party whose commitment to the present leadership of the party is not quite certain.  A fourth consists of members of ethnic minority parties who remain with the government on sufferance, as they fear to be in opposition to the government. 
 
The ability of the government to steer this diverse array of groups and interests in the direction of a political solution is doubtful.  The ethnic conflict is one which had defied a political solution for over six decades, spanning the entirety of the country’s independence.  It seems to be too much to expect a government that is so fragmented as the present one, and which does not enjoy a clear majority in Parliament, to accomplish what more unified governments failed to do.  In these circumstances, the easier course for the government to follow would be to accelerate the war against the LTTE and use the war and patriotism to unify the ethnic majority while silencing the opposition, at least for a while.
 
 
POTENTIAL SANCTIONS
 
The abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement may therefore have a rationale that goes beyond the obvious one of catering to the JVP’s agenda in order to retain its parliamentary support. One of the features of the present war that has earned international opprobrium has been the high level of human rights violations.  In this context the abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement will also make the prosecution of the war easier, because it will eliminate the presence of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission set up under the agreement to query the conflicting parties about their non-compliance with its provisions and which had a mandate to report on violations of the agreement. 
 
Although the international monitors were never able to actually put a stop to the acts of violence, their presence on the ground is likely to have had some sort of deterrent effect, as their reports were widely read by the international community.  The dismantling of their monitoring apparatus can set the stage for an escalation of violence with an even greater level of impunity than at present.  This would have catastrophic consequences to the people caught up in the conflict zones in particular, as both the government and LTTE have been effective in keeping out both media and other non partisan monitors from those areas.
 
At least in the propaganda and psychological war, the ground is being set for a fight to the finish.  A considerable amount of optimism has been generated that the LTTE can be effectively defeated in the course of the year.  Such sentiment is neither new nor novel, and it has surfaced on many occasions in the past, although on this occasion the LTTE has taken the most severe battering ever.  On the other hand, the organisation has been around for over three decades during which they have taken control over large tracts of territory.  Whether an organization that has created a military and administrative machinery strong enough to survive for nearly three decades will be eliminated in a matter of months is open to question. 
 
The success of the present government is that it seems to have convinced the majority in the country that what was not possible in the past will be possible today.  The LTTE’s recalcitrance and the government’s recent military victories have combined to change a 70 percent level of support for the peace process in which the Ceasefire Agreement was the key component into one of 80 percent support for war.  But the international community has stood by a negotiated political settlement. The main challenge that the government faces in the short term is the reaction of the international community.  The statements by Sri Lanka’s main donors, including Japan, indicating concern about abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement can change into actions in the event of escalated war sans political reform, he added.
End